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COMMENTARY
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBSTITUTED AGENCY FACT-FINDING:
FLORIDA COURTS' INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO THE
COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE "CONUNDRUM"
INTRODUCTION

By enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1 in 1974, the Florida
Legislature intended to create a uniform system of administrative rulemaking
and adjudicative procedure. 2 Consonant with that goal, the APA established
detailed criteria for judicial review of action by administrative agencies.3
Despite this meritorious attempt to provide legislative guidance, confusion arose
over the judiciary's proper role in reviewing substituted agency findings of
fact.
The APA provides that all proceedings involving a "disputed issue of
material fact" in which an agency determines the "substantial interests" 4 of a
party shall be conducted as formal proceedings. 5 An assigned hearing officer'

1. FLA. STAT. Ch. 120 (1981).
2. Id. § 120.72(1)(a). See also Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for The State of Florida 5 (March 9, 1974) (unpublished report available in the
Legal Information Center of the Holland Law Center, University of Florida) (delineates due
process minima and basic notions of fairness, which were neither uniformly nor universally
applied prior to the APA) [hereinafter cited as Reporter's Comments].
3. The APA primarily defines agency action as "the whole or part of a rule or order, or the
equivalent, or the denial of a petition to adopt a rule or issue an order." FLA. STAT. § 120.52(2)
(1981). The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure define administrative action as "an order of
any public official, including the Governor in the exercise of all executive powers other than
those derived from the Constitution, or of any agency, department, board or commission of
the State or any political subdivision, including municipalities." FLA. APP.R. 9.020(a).
4. For examples of interests sufficiently substantial to entitle a party to request a hearing,
see Burgess v. Department of Commerce, 400 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (per
curiam) (agency decision to redesignate job classification affected employee's interest in retaining her present position); Couch Constr. Co. v. Department of Transp., 3861 So. 2d 184,
186 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (permitting losing bidder for a contracting job to receive hearing
from the agency).
5. FIA. STAT. § 120.57 (1981). Where the proceeding does not involve a disputed issue of
material fact, it may be conducted as an informal proceeding under § 120.57(2). Such proceedings, which may or may not involve hearing officers, facilitate the expeditious resolution
of conflicts, yet remain subject to judicial review under § 120.68. See United States Serv. Indus.
- Florida v. State, 383 So. 2d 728, 728-29 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1980).
6. The APA provides agencies the option to request a hearing officer from the Division
of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(3) (1981). All hearings, however, must be conducted before a hearing officer, except in eight statutorily-excepted instances,
such as hearings before agency heads. Id. § 120.57(1)(a)(l)-(8). The agency therefore must
either conduct the hearing before a DOAH hearing officer or follow one of the eight specified
procedures. As used in this commentary, hearing officer connotes not only DOAH hearing
officers, but also any fact-finders, such as appeals referees, presiding over the initial administrative hearing.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

presides at the evidentiary hearing 7 and submits to the agency a recommended
order with findings of fact and conclusions of law." Based upon its review of
this recommendation, the agency promulgates a final order 9 which is judicially
reviewable upon request of any party adversely affected by the agency action. 10
While this adjudicative framework seems straightforward, a reviewing
court's task compounds when the agency's final order substitutes its own fact-

findings for those of the hearing officer. The APA precludes an agency from
rejecting or modifying the hearing officer's findings of fact unless it first determines, after reviewing the complete record,1 that those findings were not
1 2
The APA also limits judicial
based upon competent substantial evidence.

7. The APA delineates the evidentiary scope of hearings as follows: "All parties shall
have an opportunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues involved, to
conduct cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence, to submit proposed findings of facts
and orders, to file exceptions to any order or hearing officer's recommended order, and to be
represented by counsel." Id. § 120.57(1)(b)(4).
8. Id. § 120.57(l)(b)(8).
9. Id. § 120.57(8). Determining what constitutes a final order or final agency action can
be difficult. See, e.g., Torres v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 384 So. 2d 978, 987 n.1
(Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1980) (decision upholding rejection of application for aid not subject to
further administrative review was final agency action); Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.
v. Barr, 359 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978) (pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1981)
agency declaratory statement is final agency action); Harris v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n,
358 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (1st D.C.A.) (agency's failure to register petitioner's trade name was final
action), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1978). The finality principle is important, however,
for courts have interpreted it as "the principle jurisdictional requisite to judicial review"
under FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1981). 4245 Corp., Mother's Lounge v. Division of Beverage, 348
So. 2d 934, 936 (1st D.C.A. 1977) (denying motion to dismiss), argued, 371 So. 2d 1032 (Fla.
1978).
10. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1981). "Adversely affected" is the APA's statutory standing requirement for challenging agency action. Significantly, the standing requirement for appearing before an agency is much less stringent than requisite standing to appeal. In Daniels v.
Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 401 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1981), the court observed:
The APA's definition of a party recognizes the need for a much broader zone of party
representation at the administrative level than at the appellate level. For example,
in rulemaking, a large number of persons may be invited or permitted by the agency to
participate as parties in the proceeding, so as to provide information to the agency
concerning a broad spectrum of policy considerations affecting proposed rules.
id. at 1354. See also Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1977)
(standing to participate in APA hearing does not require that the contesting party's own
substantial rights be in question, but only that the substantial rights of a party be in
question).
11. The APA defines "record" quite broadly to include all evidence received, any decision or report by the hearing officer, and an official transcript of the hearing. Id.
§ 120.57(1)(b)(5)(a)-(i). In Florida, confusion exists as to the type of subject matter an agency
may administratively notice to supplement the record in promulgating its order. See
Peoples Bank of Indian River County v. State, 395 So. 2d 521, 524-25 (Fla. 1981) (expressly
leaving the question open). The APA is explicit about official recognition in rulemaking proceedings. There, an agency may recognize any material that may be judicially noticed, so long
as all parties are advised of these materials, are given access to them and have an opportunity
to comment or rebut. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(6) (1981).
12. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1981).
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discretion in reviewing agency action. A court may not substitute its own judgment on the weight of evidence supporting the agency's findings of fact;' s
it may only overturn agency orders based upon facts not supported by
competent substantial evidence.. 4 These successive competent substantial evidence standards 5 pose a "conundrum" for the reviewing court: the court must
give proper deference to the agency's findings while ensuring the agency gave
proper deference to the hearing officer's findings.'8
In response to this problem, Florida courts have adopted a non-statutory
differentiation between "policy" facts, those particularly susceptible to agency
determination, and "credibility" facts, which are specifically within a hearing
officer's determinative competence. Because private parties bear the burden
and expense of judicial review of agency action, 17 this distinction has important
ramifications in a society where administrative agencies exert increasing influence.'" This commentary will therefore examine the credibility/policy
distinction and its development by Florida courts. The theoretical underpinnings and effectiveness of the distinction will be analyzed in light of both
the APA's goal of promoting uniform administrative procedure and the
distinction's effect on judicial integrity. The commentary will conclude by
offering guidance for using the distinction to determine the prospects of
successfully appealing an agency's, final order based upon substituted findings
of fact.

13. Id. § 120.68(10). See, e.g., Gentsch, Larsen, Traad, M.D. v. Florida Dep't of Labor &
Unemployment Sec., 390 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980); Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v.
State Dep't of Revenue, 339 So. 2d 685, 686 (1st D.CA. 1976), modified, 354 So. 2d 353 (Fla.
1978) (modifying amount of assessed penalty).
14. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1981). For a general discussion of judicial review of agency
fact-findings under Florida's APA, see 2 A. ENGLAND & L. LEvINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE
PRAcricE MANUAL 75-79 (1979).
15. The statutory competent substantial evidence standard for appellate review of an
administrative order essentially codifies the standard adopted in DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d
912 (Fla. 1957) (en banc). The DeGroot court described the traditional substantial evidence
standard as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." Id. at 916 (citing Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379,20 So. 2d 912 (1944)). By
adding the additional requirement of competence, the court sought to ensure that the
evidence relied upon was "sufficiently relevant and material" in a procedural sense. Id. at 916.
In interpreting the APA's competent substantial evidence standards, courts still look to
DeGroot for guidance. See, e.g., City of Bartow v. Public Employees Relation Comm'n, 382
So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
16. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 578 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977).
17. Although a court in its discretion may award attorneys fees and costs for a successful
appeal, private litigants ordinarily bear the cost of appeal. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(9)
(1981). See also Waas, The Administrative Appeal, 51 FLA. B.J. 276, 277 & 278 nn. & 3 (May
1977) (delineating statutory scheme of assessing appeal costs prior to repeal of the bad faith
requirement for awarding fees). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 120.69(7) (1981) (in deciding a petition for
enforcement, court may award prevailing party reasonable attorney fees whenever appropriate).
18. See generally Karl & Lehrman, Our Work, Trends in Administrative Law, 54 FLA.
B.J. 24 (1980) (outlining the increasing Florida administrative law practice resulting from

burgeoning agency influence in society).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

CREDIBILITY VERSUS POLICY FACTS:
THE

McDonald APPROACH

The 1977 First District Court of Appeal 19 opinion in McDonald v. Department of Banking & Finance2o embarked Florida courts on the course of distinguishing between credibility and policy facts when reviewing agency factfinding. McDonald appealed the Department's final order rejecting his request
for authority to organize a bank. In denying the application, the Department
rejected many of the hearing officer's findings of fact as not based upon compe2
1
tent substantial evidence." Reversing the agency's order and remanding
the case for further hearings, the court determined the agency improperly
2
substituted its own fact-findings for those of the hearing officer. "
In reaching its decision, the McDonald court recognized the disparate nature
of certain findings of fact. Some facts, such as witness credibility or facts susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, tend to fall within the hearing officer's
adjudicative competence. 2 4 Other facts are inseparable from policy considerations over which the agency has special responsibility. Such facts are increasingly infused with opinion and, accordingly, reviewing courts allow
agencies more latitude in substituting their own findings for those of the hearing officer. 2" The substantiality of the evidence supporting the Department's
order therefore depended upon the categorization of the agency's findings
26
along the credibility/policy continuum.
19. The APA's venue provisions provide for review in the district court where the
agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Because Tallahassee, the state
capital and location of many state agency headquarters, lies in the First District, that district
handles most administrative law cases. See Johnson v. Superintendent of Hernando County,
349 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (head of agency in teacher dismissal suit is local
school board; but State Board of Education, a party by virtue of its administrative review,
effectively resided in Tallahassee and therefore First District was an appropriate forum).
20. 346 So. 2d 569 (1st D.C.A. 1977), on appeal after remand, 361 So. 2d 199 (1978), cert.
denied, 368 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1979).
21. 346 So. 2d at 577.
22. If the reviewing court determines agency action was based upon any fact-finding
not supported by competent substantial evidence, the court shall remand or set aside the
agency action. F.A. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1981). See also Harvey v. Nuzum, 345 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1977) (describing the remand prerogative as "customary"). In cases involving erroneous substituted fact-finding, courts have made varied use of the remand option. See, e.g.,
Wade Bradford Grove Serv., Inc. v. Bowen Bros., Inc., 382 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1980)
(remanding for hearing officer to take additional testimony); Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 376 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (2d D.C.A. 1979) (remanding
for entry of order consistent with heading officer's fact-findings), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1112
(Fla. 1980).
23. 346 So. 2d at 585-86.
24. Id. at 579. The McDonald court observed an appellate court naturally grants "greater
probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the
weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise
susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not
rightfully claim special insight." Id.
25. Id.
26. The distinction has its origins in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), cited by the McDonald court. 346 So. 2d at 578. The Court observed the importance
of its determination:
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Examining the McDonald findings illuminates the distinction the court
adopted. The Department interpreted statutory prerequisites for approving
the bank organization application. 27 Those criteria included requirements that,
in the Department's opinion, the bank should have reasonable promise of
28
success, competent management, and adequate proposed banking quarters.
The first two criteria required substantial determinations of opinion particularly suitable to agency interpretation. The last criterion involved ordinary
29
factual issues susceptible of the hearing officer's fact-finding competence.
McDonald's significance, however, extends beyond categorizing facts to determine whether competent substantial evidence supports agency action. It
attempts to respect the relative positions of hearing officers, agencies, and
courts in the administrative decision-making process. From a narrow perspective, hearing officers resolve facts, agencies respond to those facts by determining
individual claims, and courts review the evidence supporting those determinations.30 From a broader perspective, the decision-making process involves incipient agency policymaking. Although agencies must ordinarily follow formal
procedures for adopting general policy as rules,3 ' they may also adopt new
The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in any way when the Board and
its examiner disagree. We intend only to recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has
observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from
the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion. ... The significance of
his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular
case.
Id. at 496. Federal courts continue to follow Universal Camera'sdeference to hearing officers on
credibility findings. See, e.g., MPC Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1973);
Duncan v. Harris, 518 F. Supp. 751, 757 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
This problem arises only when the agency substitutes its findings for those of the hearing
officer. In instances where the agency adopts the hearing officer's findings, courts find no need
to classify the findings in question as policy or credibility. See ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 397 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981). Courts must only then determine whether APA procedures have been followed, whether competent substantial evidence
appropriate to the issue supports the finding and whether the agency action is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Id. The appropriateness of the evidence turns upon the "nature of
the issues involved." See Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 24 (1st
D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979). The substantiality requirement implicitly differs between different types of cases. For example, evidence sufficiently substantial
to support ordinary regulatory action might not support a license suspension or revocation.
See Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 171-72 (Fla. Ist D.CA. 1981).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 659.03(2)(a)-(f) (1981).
28. 346 So. 2d at 584-86.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 582-83.
31. Fr. STAT. § 120.54 (1981) provides adoption procedures for agency rulemaking. The
APA defines a rule as "each agency statement of general applicability that implements,
interprets, or prescribes law or policy..... Id. § 120.52(14). See also Department of Revenue
v. United States Sugar Corp., 388 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1980) (tax provision made
no distinction between contract and common carriers; Department established a rule by
adopting policy distinguishing between the two); State Dep't Commerce v. Matthews
Corp., 358 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1978) (determinations of wage rates were not rules,
where applicable only to specific construction contracts).
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policies through the individual adjudicative process.3 2 If an agency chooses to
utilize adjudicative policyraking, a second tier of duties emerges: hearing
officers must respond in a manner that promotes responsible agency policymaking; 33 agencies must support non-rule policy through corroborative evidence
and argument;3 4 and courts must preserve agency policymaking discretion while
ensuring the agency has substantiated its non-rule policy. 35 McDonald attempts
to crystallize the roles in the administrative process to further the APA's goal of
uniform agency action. To determine whether the McDonald approach of
distinguishing credibility and policy facts 36 actually promotes this goal, subsequent development of the distinction must be examined.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY/CREDIBILITY DISTINCTION

The distinction between credibility and policy facts is elucidated by closely
examining specific factual findings. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of
Business Regulation,3 7 an agency order found that Anheuser-Busch violated

The McDonald court noted formal rulemaking's contribution to fairness by providing
notice to affected persons. 346 So. 2d at 580. The court was concerned that allowing policymaking during adjudication might cause APA rule adoption procedures to atrophy. Id. The
court could not find, however, that the APA prohibits all policy making other than through
formal rulemaking. Id.
32. 346 So. 2d at 582-83.
33. The McDonald court described the hearing officer's function as follows:
The hearing officer's function creates agency incentives for rulemaking, which as far as
it goes displaces proof and debate of policy in 120.57 proceedings; encourages an
agency to fully and skillfully expound its non-rule policies by conventional proof
methods; and, in appropriate cases, subjects agency policymakers to the sobering realization their policies lack convincing wisdom, and requires them to cope with the hearing
officer's adverse commentary.
Id. at 583 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. The court observed that as facts "blur" into opinions, the agency's ability to
substitute its findings correspondingly increases. At the same time, however, the agency's duty
to expose its reasoning also increases. Id. See also Smart v. Board of Real Estate, 421 So. 2d 22,
23 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) ("where ultimate facts include opinions infused with policy insight,
the agency is required to explain its action"); FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(9) (1981) (agency must
state with particularity the reasoning behind the fact substitution).
35. 346 So. 2d at 583. See also FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (1981) (court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency on a matter of discretion).
36. The terms "credibility" and "policy" facts are used because they best approximate
the language used by Florida courts in the area. Federal courts have coined different terms that
may better convey the concepts represented. For example, the court in Saginaw Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559-60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 613 (1938), spoke of "basic"
facts and "ultimate" facts. The court in American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194
F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952), alternatively spoke of "testimonial inferences" and "derivative inferences." Regardless of the terminology chosen, these
phrases indicate discrete steps in the fact-finding process, which can be described as follows:
(1) taking evidence; (2) considering the evidence to determine basic facts; (3) inferring
ultimate facts from the previously ascertained basic facts; and (4) applying statutory criteria
based upon the ultimate findings. See Saginaw Broadcasting,96 F.2d at 560. Under this framework, step two is credibility fact-finding and step three is policy fact-finding.
37. 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
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Florida's "Tied House Evil"' law, 30 which prohibits beverage manufacturers
from giving a "gift" to retail vendors. Based on stipulated facts, the hearing
officer determined Anheuser-Busch's bar-spending practice"9 did not constitute
a gift. The agency purportedly adopted these findings, but concluded the
activities involved substantial worth to vendors and were therefore statutorily
prohibited gifts.40
The Anheuser-Busch court recognized that the agency was attempting to
formulate a new policy prohibiting bar-spending as gifts.41 Although an agency
has discretion to make policy through either formal rule promulgation or
individual case adjudication, if it chooses the latter prerogative, the hearing
officer's findings check that discretion. 42 Because there was no evidence indicating vendors received substantial worth from bar-spending, the court found the
agency's factual premise inadequate to support its new policy that bar-spending
is a gift.4s Anheuser-Busch demonstrates agency conclusions on policy facts must
be predicated with adequate credibility facts."
The agency order in Jenkins v. State Board of Education" had a similar
defect. Jenkins involved a teacher's dismissal based upon intimations of improper sexual conduct with a student. The hearing officer, however, found no
evidence supporting the request that the teacher be suspended for conduct
seriously reducing the teacher's effectiveness. 4" Although the agency expressly
adopted the officer's findings of fact and recommendation against suspension
on the reduced effectiveness ground, it ordered suspension based upon the
teacher's alleged failure to protect the student's health and safety. 47 The First
38. FLA. STAT. § 561.42(1) (1981). This provision provides: "No licensed manufacturer or
distributor of any beverage... shall... assist any vendor by any gifts or loans of money or
property ...." Id.
39. Bar-spending is the common practice by beverage manufacturers of sponsoring free
beer parties in bars during college vacation season. As a promotional mechanism, the manufacturer provides free beer to the vendor's customers by reimbursing the vendor for the
beer's ordinary retail price. 393 So. 2d at 1179.
40. Id. at 1180.
41. Id. at 1182. Neither the statute nor the rules in force at the time of the action dearly
mandated the construction of bar-spending as a gift.
42. Id. at 1182-83. In addition, the agency must re-prove the facts supporting incipient
agency policy in each individual case. See State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Barr, 359
So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978); Hill v. School Bd. of Leon County, 351 So. 2d 732, 733
(1st D.C.A. 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).
43. 393 So. 2d at 1182.
44. The court elucidated the following standard for substantiating non-rule policy:
"iT]he accuracy of every factual premise and the rationality of every policy choice which is
identifiable and reasonably debatable must be shown by some kind of evidence undergirding
the order which makes that policy choice on that factual premise." Id.
45. 399 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
46. See id. at 104-05. Although the hearing officer's determination was undoubtedly correct,
strong circumstantial evidence indicated improper conduct. The male teacher and his
female student were found at night in a car parked in the country. The teacher had
allegedly stopped the car because the student felt ill, and when the police arrived, both were
in the back seat. Although the temperature -was approximatley 40 degrees that night, the
teacher was clad only in pants and socks. Despite these incriminating circumstances, all involved, including the student herself, testified there was no improper conduct involved. Id.
47. Id. at 105.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

District reversed the order, observing the record was bereft of evidence supporting the order and that the agency failed to elucidate any non-rule policy it
might be promoting. 48 As the court noted, the tenor of the proceeding below
centered around the delicate nature of the alleged misconduct, sexual activity
with a minor. The Jenkins decision thus ensures that agencies do not expressly
adopt findings of fact, yet issue orders implicitly based upon facts rejected in
49

those findings.

Like the distinction between credibility and policy facts, differentiation
between findings of fact and conclusions of law must also be clarified. In School
50
the First District addressed this problem
Board of Leon County v. Hargis,
when it rejected an order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The
Commission adopted the hearing officer's fact-findings but reversed his conclusions of law, finding illegal employment discrimination based upon race.
The court noted no special consideration arose from the agency's categorization
of its conclusions as law.51 Although the Commission may claim special insight
into the "subleties of racial discrimination," its finding that the petitioner's
activities were a pretext for discrimination was impermissibly based upon
discernible motives of the parties involved.52 Regardless of classifying the findings as fact or law, in substituting its interpretation of this credibility fact, the
court determined the agency improperly invaded the hearing officer's factfinding function.5 3 Hargis and Jenkins together establish the appropriateness
of applying the credibility/policy distinction when the agency ostensibly, yet
not overtly, rejects the hearing officer's findings of fact.

48. Id.
49. Significantly, the court found the case should have been reversed because the agency's
health and safety rationale was not a statutory basis for suspension. Id. The court's extensive
discussion of the substituted ground for dismissal issue therefore stands as a strong condemnation of agency action implicitly premised upon previously rejected fact-findings.
50. 400 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
51. Id. at 107. In Hernicz v. Department of Prof. Reg., 390 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Ist
D.C.A. 1980) (per curiam), the court took an approach similar to that in Hargis. The court
determined that a conclusion of law erroneously inserted into the fact section of the agency's
order did not change the conclusion of law into an improperly substituted fact. Id. at 195. See
also Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1046, 10-49 (Fla. Ist
D.C.A. 1982) (agency rejected as a conclusion of law hearing officer's finding that water
quality would be lowered; the court, however, treated the substituted conclusion as a policy
finding of fact); J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Department of Gen. Servs., 356 So. 2d 43, 43 (Ist
D.C.A.) (per curiam) (agency's interpretation of contract was finding of law, not fact), cert.
denied, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
52. The case involved two school cafeteria workers, one caucasian and one black, competing to fill a job vacancy. The caucasian worker took the job after a seemingly endless
process of faulty bureaucratic communication and coordination. Although the hearing officer
found no evidence indicated racial discrimination, the agency determined the lack of communication constituted a pretext for avoiding promotion of the black applicant. 400 So. 2d
at 106. The court therefore concluded the agency was incapable "of making unarticulated,
speculative, and uncomplimentary assumptions about the purposes, motives, and abilities of
persons unseen, unheard, and unknown." Id. at 107.
53. Id. See also Silver Sand Co. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1979) (agency may not characterize findings of fact as legal conclusions to avoid requirements of statute).
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APPRAISAL OF THE CREDIBILITY/PoLICY DISTINCTION

,

Concerns over uniform agency action focus upon fundamental notions of
due process. 54 Because the delegation of administrative duties to agencies may
lead to abuse,55 judicial review of agency orders under the APA attempts to
ensure affected parties' interests have been accounted for in the decision-making
process and to correct deficiencies that might occur.56 At the same time, however,
courts must allow agencies freedom to exercise their expertise and special skills
in implementing their delegated duties.5 7 The APA's purpoie is to protect
these contrasting interests and to encourage "initiative and self-discipline within
the executive branch." 58 The Florida Supreme Court has embraced the
credibility/policy distinction for reviewing the substantiality of evidence
supporting incipient agency policy;59 therefore, it is important to discern
54. Various attempts have been made to outline the .due process focus of administrative
procedure acts. See State Rd. Dep't v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 207 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1968) (to protect a person's rights, duties, privileges or immunities that the agency
administers); Reporter's Comments, supra note 2, at 5 ("Three due process checks to prevent
arbitrary agency action are the requirements that reasons be stated for all action taken or
omitted, that reasons be supported by 'the record,' and that specific judicial review procedure allow the courts to remedy defects of substance."). See also Bath Club, Inc. v. Dade
County, 394 So. 2d 110, 113-14 (Fla. 1981) (if one adequate means of judicial review of agency
action is available, due process is met) (citing Johnson v. McNeill, 151 Fla. 606, 610, 10 So. 2d
143, 145 (1942)).
55. See Alley, Agency Accountability: Judicial Remedies for Wrongful Agency Action
Under the Florida APA, 54 FLA. B.J. 445, 445 (1980) ("the powers that are committed to
these [administrative] regulating agencies, and which they must have to do their work, carry
with them great and dangerous opportunities for oppression and wrong!) (quoting Root,
Address of the President, 41 A.B.A. REP. 369 (1916)) (emphasis added by Alley); Karl &
Lehrman, supra note 18, at 26 (due to human nature, those involved with agencies often
attempt to exercise the agency's delegated power to what is believed its fullest extent).
56. See Reporter's Comments, supra note 2, at 5-7. See also Bonfield, An Introduction to
the 19$1 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Part I, 34 AD.L. REv. 1, 1 (1982) (one of
the primary objectives of an administrative procedure act is to protect private rights against
unlawful or unfounded agency action). The APA did not intend for the courts to freely overturn agency action. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 584 n.13. See also Brodie & Linde, State Court
Review of Administrative Action: Prescribingthe Scope of Review, 1977 Amuz. ST. L.J. 537, 563
(Florida's APA sets standards for judicial surveillance of agency action and prohibits "reversal
by epithet.').
57. See Holden v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 400 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1981)
(whether prisoner's intended marriage would endanger prison security clearly fell within
the Department's delegated discretion); Couch Constr. Co. v. Department of Transp., 361
So. 2d 172, 183 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (Boyer, C.J., dissenting) (APA does not divest agency's
lawful discretion; discretion implies the right to elect); McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 584-86.
Agencies traditionally have been given great deference in interpreting the statutes they
are delegated authority to administer. See Austin v. Austin, 350 So. 2d 102, 104 (Ist D.C.A.
1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1978); Note, Florida Administrative Procedure Act:
Five Years of Judicial Review (Winter 1980) (unpublished work available in University of
Florida Law Review Office). In the fact-finding setting, agencies contribute technical expertise, specialization, and repeated contact with the regulatory statutes to the process. See
Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58
HAiv. L. REv. 70, 82 (1944).
58. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787, 818
(Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1982) (Smith, J., dissenting). See also Bonfield, supra note 56, at 1.
59. Duval Util. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 380 So. 2d 1028, 1031 n.3 (Fla. 1980)
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whether the distinction implements the APA's goals and to determine its effect
on both judicial integrity and administrative practice.
The Judiciary's Perspective: An Effective Distinction
With Ramifications on Judicial Integrity
Case law indicates that the credibility/policy distinction has concretized the
hearing officer's and agency's fact-finding roles. Courts reviewing agency orders
based upon substituted credibility facts almost uniformly reject those orders
as invading the hearing officer's pure fact-finding function,60 thus solidifying
the hearing officer's position in the decision-making process. 61 Furthermore, the
Jenkins and Hargis courts' refusal to accept veiled agency encroachment on
the hearing officer's fact-finding domain promotes procedurally sound adminsitrative decision-making.
Judicial reaction to substituted policy facts is not as clear. Courts have
generally upheld agency orders when the primary issue is the substantial
competence of substituted agency policy findings.62 By granting greater weight
(citing McDonald as providing the test for determining whether competent substantial evidence
supports incipient agency policy determinations). In addition, two other Florida district courts
of appeal have adopted the credibility/policy distinction. See Andrus v. Florida Dep't of Employment Sec., 379 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980) (dictum); Koltay v. Division of Gen.
Reg., 374 So. 2d 1386, 1390-91 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
60. See School Bd. of Leon County v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981);
Cenac v. Florida State Bd. of Acct'g, 399 So. 2d 1013, 1015-16 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981); Sapp v.
Florida State Bd. of Nursing, 384 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980); Tampa Wholesale
Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 376 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (2d D.C.A.
1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1980); Koltay v. Division of Gen. Reg., 374
So. 2d 1386, 1391 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979); Samson v. Bureau of Community Medical Facilities,
363 So. 2d 412, 416 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978); McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 584-86.
For decisions implicitly classifying facts as credibility and rejecting substituted agency
findings, see Jenkins v. State Bd. of Educ., 399 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (discussed supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text); Henderson Signs v. Florida Dep't of Transp.,
397 So. 2d 769, 773 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (agency effectively modified essential findings as to
whether highway was open on date in question); Wade Bradford Grove Serv., Inc. v. Bowen
Bros., Inc., 382 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) (agency's order conflicted with unrebutted testimony taken at hearing); Gruman v. State Dep't of Revenue, 379 So. 2d 1313, 1316
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) (hearing officer's finding that party never agreed to pay mortgage was
binding on Department); Shablowski v. State Dep't of Envtl. Reg., 370 So. 2d 50, 54 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1979) (order overturning findings on extent to which fill activity is contrary to
public's interest); Silver Sand Co. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 1090, 1092-93 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1979) (substituted finding concerning agent's apparent and actual authority to purchase gasoline for client); Catholic Social Serv. v. State Dep't of Commerce, 365 So. 2d 427, 429
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (order disregarding hearing officer's finding based upon conflicting
evidence of two witnesses); Boyette v. State Prof. Practices Council, 346 So. 2d 601, 602-03 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1977) (order rejecting hearing officer's finding that evidence failed to show elements
constituting forcible rape).
61. The importance of hearing officers should not be underestimated. In administrative
proceedings, the hearing officer, not the agency, is the trier of fact. As one commentator observed, implicit in McDonald is the notion that an outside hearing officer is essential to fairness
and due process under the APA. Sheldon, 1977 Amendments to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 443, 451 (1978).
62. See City of Clearwater Fire Dep't v. Lewis, 404 So. 2d 1156, 1162 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1981);
Holden v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 400 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1981); Gulf State

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/7

10

Larimore: Judicial Review of Substituted Agency Fact-Finding: Florida Court
1983]

COMMENTARY

to agency policy determinations, courts recognize the need to permit agency
action that initiates or refines general policies through individual case adjudication.03 The additional requirement that policy facts are supported by
adequate credibility facts bridles potentially unrestrained adjudicative policymaking.64 This restraint is not unreasonable. If the agency does not follow
the formal APA rulemaking procedures,65 it must justify the policy developed
in individual cases with supporting facts.66 Both procedures expose agency
decision-making to careful scrutiny, while the latter procedure also preserves
67
the hearing officer's function.
Because the initial classification of a fact correlates to the court's ultimate
ruling, the major criticism of the distinction is that its effectiveness depends
upon predictable categorization of a specific fact as credibility or policy. The
Bank v. State Dep't of Banking & Fin., 367 So. 2d 671, 672-73 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1979); McDonald
v. Department of Banking & Fin., 361 So. 2d 199, 201 (1st D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d
1370 (Fla. 1979); Fraser v. Lewis, 360 So. 2d 1116, 1117-18 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1978). But see
Boyette v. State Prof. Practices Council, 346 So. 2d 601, 604 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (quashing

agency order based upon substituted policy findings not supported by competent substantial
evidence).
63. See Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla.
1980) (citing McDonald).
64. The potential for runaway agency policymaking is not an abstract concern. From the

agencies' perspective there are numerous advantages to incipient policymaking in contrast
to rulemaking. These advantages include flexibility, retroactivity, particularity and avoidance
of possible reprimand by the legislature's administrative procedures committee. See AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
65. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1981). See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
67. A comparison of the Florida APA and the federal APA provides insight into differing
philosophical perceptions of the agency's versus the hearing officer's proper roles in the administrative process. The federal APA, the traditional model, grants an agency "all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision," when reviewing a hearing officer's
determinations. 5 U.S.C. § 5576 (1976). The Florida APA has no corresponding provision. In
addition, although a federal court considers the hearing officer's findings in determining
whether substantial evidence supports the agency's findings, the agency remains the primary
fact finder. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955). Thus, the role
of the federal hearing officer differs greatly from that of a judicial officer whose decision is
merely subject to review on appeal. The federal hearing officer is more of an advisor than
an actual decision-maker. Traditionalists see this as desirable because enhancing the position
of hearing officers would be inconsistent with the agency's responsibility to carry out the
duties delegated to it by the legislature. See K. DAVIS, ADmrIST'RATmVE LAw Txxi § 10.07 (1972).
Undoubtedly, the Florida APA presents a different model, as it contemplates the hearing
officer as a much more independent decision-maker. This scheme reflects recent dissatisfaction
with the traditional model of granting virtually unchecked discretion to agencies in executing
their legislative mandate. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
H
v. L. Ray. 1669, 1681-88 (1975) (outlining the problem of agency discretion); Note,
Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 YALE L.J. 739, 740-41
(1981) (delineating traditional justifications for granting agency discretion and recent doubts as
to the continued efficacy of ihis model). Regardless of the validity of concerns over unchecked
agency discretion, the competent substantial evidence standard placed on agencies in FLA.
STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1981) and the failure to adopt a counterpart to the federal § 557b are
direct legislative indications of an intent to modify the traditional administrative model. The
emphasis found in Florida case law on preserving the hearing officer's role in the administrative
process therefore merely reflects the legislative policy choice of modifying the traditionalist
model.
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McDonald approach lends greater weight to the agency's or the hearing officer's
fact-findings depending upon its credibility/policy categorization. If this identification is not readily ascertainable, courts might be accused of using the
distinction to foreshadow a desired result.
Several factors, however, mitigate this criticism. Credibility facts are analogous to those within the trier of facts' competence for which an appellate
court may not substitute its judgment on an ordinary appeal. 68 When reviewing substituted agency fact-finding, courts have this experience to draw upon
in determining which facts are particularly within the hearing officer's competence. 69 Additionally, in most cases the distinction seems clear-cut, which reduces the opportunity for judicial manipulation. In this regard, there have
been few disagreements within individual appellate panels over the categorization of specific facts as credibility or policy.70 This suggests consistent application of the distinction.
Notwithstanding these indications of even-handed application, the potential for manipulating the distinction in ambiguous cases undermines judicial
integrity. To further predictability and impartiality, the judiciary must maintain the distinction's effectiveness by creating an expectation of the judicial
categorization of facts not immediately identifiable as policy or credibility. The
judiciary could accomplish this by explicitly stating that findings other than
clear-cut credibility facts will be categorized as policy facts. 71 Under the man68. See Tampa Wholesale Liquors v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 376
So. 2d 1195, 1197 (1st D.C.A. 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1980); Koltay v. Division
of Gen. Reg., 374 So. 2d 1386, 1391 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1976). Both Tampa Wholesale and Koltay
relied upon the reasoning of Venetian Shores Home & Property Owners v. Ruzakawski, 336
So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). In this pre-McDonald decision, the Venetian Shores court
articulated the posture courts would later take when examining credibility facts: "We do not
think that the Administrative Procedure Act can be read to grant to the head of an agency
greater powers over an examiner's findings than those of a trial judge over the findings of a
master in chancery." Id. at 401. In Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 174 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1981), the court described these credibility facts as "plain, garden-variety fact[s]."
69. See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16-17 (Fla. 1976) (function of trial court is to
weigh credibility; function of appellate court is not to re-weigh evidence); Westerman v. Shell's
City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43, 45-46 (Fla. 1972) (appellate court cannot re-evaluate evidence and
improperly substitute its judgment for that of trial court on question of whether parties
entered oral contract). Arguably, the standards expounded in Shaw and Westerman are
subject to manipulation as well. The decisions, however, are helpful guidelines for ascertaining which facts fall within the credibility nomenclature.
70. For example, of the 21 courts applying the credibility/policy distinction, cited supra
notes 60 & 62, only two dissents questioned the majority's categorization of the facts in
question. See Shablowski v. State Dep't of Envtl. Reg., 370 So. 2d 50, 54 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979)
(Ervin, J., dissenting) (determination of whether biological effects of fill project would be
contrary to public interest is not a factual determination as majority held, but policy); Silver
Sand Co. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 1090, 1097 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting) (findings concerning the extent of agency relationship are not facts as majority
held, but legal conclusion).
71. Both McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 584, and Peoples Bank v. State Dep't of Banking &
Fin., 395 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 1981), foretell this conclusion. These decisions recognize the
appropriateness of classifying findings simultaneously based upon "pure fact-finding" and
policy considerations as policy findings. The classification of truly ambiguous findings as
policy is a logical extension of this judicial attitude toward mixed fact-finding. See also
Reporter's Comments, supra note 2, at 6-7 (APA's purpose of allowing total flexibility in ad-
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date of Anheuser-Busch, even if these borderline facts are classified as policy,
the underlying predicate of credibility facts would be required72 Moreover, this
policy would not usurp the hearing officer's fact-finding competence nor
diminish the distinction's usefulness. 73 The expectation that ambiguous facts
will be construed as policy facts would entail a self-imposed restraint on the
courts not to disappoint the expectations created, lest they tarnish their perceived neutrality in applying the distinction.
The Advocate's Perspective: The Distinction
As a Tool to Gauge Reversibility
The credibility/policy distinction's practical usefulness for determining
reversibility in a particular case aids the administrative practitioner. Because
private parties usually bear the expense of appealing adverse agency action,74
advocates must be able to advise their clients whether to appeal. The key to
successfully utilizing the distinction to predict reversibility lies in properly
classifying the substituted facts. To determine whether the facts in question
are credibility an attorney should first draw on previous cases classifying
analogous facts. If the facts are credibility facts, they will invoke judicial
deference to the hearing officer's fact-finding competence and will likely result
75
in reversal of the agency's substituted findings.
If the facts cannot be classified as credibility, the agency action may only be
sustained by navigating between judicial pincers operating in the policy arena.
On one side, courts require agency policymaking to be fully explained6 and
to be substantiated with such credibility facts as can be proven by ordinary
ministrative fact-finding in both rulemaking proceedings and policymaking individual cases
is to abrogate the legislative/judicial distinction in agency decision-making).
72. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. Observe that the "clear cut" and
"borderline" terminology is not used to denote legal standards. Rather, it expresses this
author's perception that most facts can be readily categorized if the Saginaw Broadcasting
analytical framework of the fact-finding process is utilized. See supra note 36.
73. The Florida APA is definitely a step away from the traditional model of granting
agencies near unchecked discretion in carrying out their delegated duties. See supra note 67.
The McDonald distinction attempts to recognize this by heightening judicial scrutiny over
certain forms of substituted agency fact-finding. Courts should be careful, however, to not
hamstring agencies attempting to carry out their legislative mandate. See K. DAvis, supra
note 67, § 10.07. The suggested pronouncement of deference in ambiguous situations would
change little in the actual operation of the distinction, but would serve as a constant reminder to the courts to respect agency authority in certain areas. It merely recognizes that
courts would be most tempted to manipulate the distinction in favor of individual claimants
and against administrative bureaucracy.
74. See supra note 17.
75. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
76. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1981), states that the agency "may not reject or modify
the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a complete review of the recozd,
and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon
competent substantial evidence ..
" See also Lewis v. Department of Prof. Reg., 410
So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1982) (requiring strict compliance with section for modification
or rejection of hearing officer's finding); Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc.,
418 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1982) (agency must specifically note and explicate
policy basis for rejection of finding).
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methods of proof. On the other side, courts reject policy of widespread scope
and general applicability actually approximating a rule7 7 and require
promulgation pursuant to the APA's formal rulemaking procedures. 78 These
constraints form a narrow corridor for affirming agency policymaking and provide an inroad to the judicial deference granted agencies on policy matters. By
wisely assessing the strength of either argument, the probability of reversing adverse agency action based upon substituted policy facts can be reasonably
assessed.

59

CONCLUSION

Although the APA provides multiple competent substantial evidence
standards for judicial review of substituted agency fact-finding, Florida courts
have responded admirably to this complexity by formulating the credibility/
policy fact distinction. This factual categorization preserves both the hearing
officer's and the agency's position in the administrative decision-making process. Consistent judicial application of the distinction lends predictability to
judicial review and encourages proper agency action formulation.
The distinction also provides litigants with valuable insight to the
amorphous competent substantial evidence standards. This judicially created
distinction stands as a guidepost for gauging the reversibility of adverse
agency action. To prevent any appearance of judicial bias, however, courts
should pronounce that ambiguous facts will be classified as policy facts. Despite
this present defect, the distinction culls from complex statutory standards a
means to further the APA's goal of channeling agency action into uniform procedure.
STEVEN M. LARIMORE
77. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(14) (1980) in part defines a rule as "each agency statement of general
applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy ..
" Cf. Reporter's
Comments, supra note 2, at 13 (definition of rule purposefully avoids technical classifications
such as "order" or "regulation," so that definition encompasses all agency action having the
described effects).
78. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177, 1181 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1981); Department of Revenue v. United States Sugar Corp., 388 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla.
Ist D.C.A. 1980). The choice between promoting policy through individual adjudication or
rulemaking is largely left to the agency. Florida Cities Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 384
So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980). The question of judicial intervention therefore rests upon deference to the agency as an extension of another branch of government. However, because of
the advantages of individual case adjudication, such as retroactivity, see supra note 64, parties'
substantial private interests may be affected. In such instances, agencies can expect courts to
"ponder whether agency rulemaking was reasonably practicable as well as desirable.
Anheuser-Busch, 393 So. 2d at 182.
79. It should be noted that a harmless error rule operates in this field of judicial review
of administrative action. E.g., Peoples Bank v. State Dep't of Banking & Fin., 395 So. 2d 521,
524 (Fla. 1981) (agency supplemented field examiner's data concerning a policy fact; court held
it harmless error because of other substantial competent evidence).
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